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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
MEASURE OF DAMAGE FOR BREACH OF WAR-
RANTY AND FOR FRAUDULENT REPRESENTA-
TIONS-Two rules with respect to the measure of damages
for breach of warranty have been enunciated by the Eng-
lish Courts. The first rule was established by the decision
in Towers v. Burret, (1786) 1 T. R. 133. In that case the
defendant sold a pair of horses to the plaintiff, warrant-
ing them to be three years old; in fact they were five
years old. The court permitted recovery of the difference
between the price paid and the actual value of the horses.
In a subsequent case1 an action was brought for breach of
warranty. The court instructed the jury to find as damages
the difference between the price paid and the value of the
property. The jury did not follow the court's instruction
but it can readily be understood what rule the early English
courts applied in respect to the measure of damages for
breach of warranty. This rule has been adopted by some
of the courts in this country, but not in Pennsylvania. The
basis for this early doctrine is, that the courts were of the
opinion that if a purchaser of an article pays less than the
actual value, he should not be deprived of his bargain. On
the other hand, if the purchaser pays more than the actual
value he should be held to his bargain.
With respect to the second rule, the learned and re-
spected Lord Eldon through his dictum2 may be deemed
to be its creator. Lord Eldon stated that the measure of
damage for the breach of warranty should be the differ-
ence between the value of the article as warranted by the
seller and its actual value as sold. In a later case involving
the same question the court refused to follow the old rule.
The court applied the doctrine set forth by Lord Eldon.'
The question naturally arises as to why the second rule
was adopted when the early cases had settled the rule on
the subject. The answer to this question is by no means
difficult. Theoretically the second rule is sound and apply-
ing it still further in a practical manner, we can readily
understand its usefulness and fairness. The underlying
thought seems to be that if another measure of damage
were used, the buyer would be deprived of his bargain.
Since the case of Cothers v. Keever, (1846) 4 Pa. 168,
the courts of this state have used as the measure of damage
'Fielder v. Starkin, (1788) 1 H. BI. 17.
2Curtis v. Hannay, (1800) 3 Esp. 82.
8Clare v. Maynard, (1837) 7 C. & P. 741.
4Curtis v. Hannay, (supra).
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the difference between the actual value of the goods and
its value as it would have been if as warranted. In the
case mentioned, the breach of warranty was set us as a
defense. It was held that the measure of damage is not
the difference between the actual value and the price paid.
This case is later cited with approval.5
The earliest case in Pennsylvania where an action was
brought for breach of warranty involved the exchange of
land for a quantity of shares of stock., The defendant
warranted that the stock would yield a certain amount of
dividend for a definite length of time. The measure of
damage used was the difference between-the actual value
of the stock and its value if it had been as warranted.
Having bound himself by his promise that the stock would
yield a certain per. cent. of dividend, the defendant obli-
gated himself to pay such sum as with the actual value
would equal the value if as warranted. He could in no
way escape from his obligation by pleading a measure of
damage other than the one set forth, i. e., merely to pay
the amount of such dividends.
From a practical point of view, where the defendant,
in an action against him for breach of warranty, has not
produced evidence as to the actual value of the property,
the court presumes the contract price to be the actual
value. The rule as to the measure of damage is still recog-
nized and the contract is not to be used where the real
value may be ascertained. 7 The basis for the rule is that
if a buyer made a bad bargain he is not to be reimbursed
for what he lost by mere bad judgment by seeking damages
for breach of warranty. This is the view in later Pennsyl-
vania cases.8 In ascertaining the value of the property in-
volved at the time of the sale, the defendant may show
the price he obtained for the goods at a public sale. 9 On
the other hand, in a later case, 0 the plaintiff contended that
the measure of damage was the difference between the
value as warranted and the worth of the property for the
plaintiff's purposes. The court rejected this theory and
-stated that for the plaintiff's purposes the property might
5Raymond Bros. v. Penna. Co., (1910) 42 Pa. Super. Ct. 601.
6Struthers v. Clark, (1858) 30 Pa. 210.
7Sugworth v. Seffel, (1874) 76 Pa. 476.
8Wasserman v. Fleisher, (1915) 249 Pa. 29; Raymond Bros. v.
Penna. Co. (supra).
OFreyman v. Knecht, (1875) 78 Pa. 141.
l0Himes v. Krehl, (1893) 154 Pa. 190.
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now be worthless; however, in the open market it might
have a fair value. Why should the defendant seller lose
the benefit of that fair value? This is supported by sub-
sequent cases." Introducing evidence as to the actual value
of the property and its value if the goods had been as
warranted is likewise important. The court will then, as a
matter of law, instruct the jury as to the measure of dam-
age.12 For the measure of damage see the cases cited."1
The enactment of the Uniform Sales Act in Pennsyl-
vania'" did not change the law as to the measure of damage
for breach of warranty. The Act is declaratory of the com-
mon law of Pennsylvania on the subject. The sections deal-
ing with the measure of damage for breach of warranty,
namely, Section 69, Clauses 6 and 7, have been construed
together, since the cases arising since the adoption of the
Act involve both clauses.
In addition to the recovery as stated in Clause 7 of
Section 69, the plaintiff could also recover expenses, if
made in good faith and not too remote under Clause 6.
The expenses incurred are held to be the loss directly and
naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events." Where
a defendant by way of recoupment set up the measure of
damage to be the same as that under Sect. 69, Clauses 6
and 7 it was held, that unless there were special circum-
stances showing proximate damage to a greater amount,
the plaintiff would recover the difference between the value
of the goods at the time of the delivery to the buyer and
the value they would have had if they had been as war-
ranted.16 On the other hand, the buyer may set up the
seller's breach of warranty by way of recoupment in di-
minution of the price."7 Where the buyer shows, through
special circumstances, that his damage is greater than the
usual amount allowed under the Act, he is entitled to re-
"Pasquinelli v. Southern Macaroni Mfg. Co., (1922) 272 Pa.
468; Samuel v. Delaware River Co., (1918) 69 Pa. Super. Ct. 605.
12Shoe v. Maerky, (1907) 35 Pa. Super. Ct. 270.
13Jones & Laughlin Steel Co. v. Wood & Co., (1915) 249 Pa.
423; Samuel v. Delaware River Steel Co., supra.
' 4Act of May 19th, 1915, P. L. 543.
15Griffin v. Metal Products Co., (1919) 264 Pa. 254; Rex Auto
Exchange v. Hoffman, (1924) 84 Pa. Super. Ct. 369; Hoffman v.
Hockfield Bros., (1920) 75 Pa. Super Ct. 595.
"6Hoffman v. Hockfield Bros., supra.
"TPlympton Cabinet Co. v. Rosenberg, (1929) 96 Pa. Super. Ct.
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cover for such damage. By special circumstances is meant
those circumstances where the buyer has acquainted the
seller with sufficient facts at the time the contract was
made, so that the damage sustained by the buyer was
reasonably contemplated.1 8
Another subject with relation to damages is the mea-
sure of damage for fraud or fraudulent representations.
In England, as well as in this country, the law on the
subject is far from harmonious. On the one side we have
the rule as set forth in Peek v. Derry, (1887) 37 Ch. Div.
541,19 namely, that the measure of damage in actions for
'fraudulent representations is the difference between the
real value of the property and the price paid. The real
value was determined as of the time of purchase which
could be shown by subsequent events and was not to be
measured by the market value at the time of purchase.
In using market value, there would be a likelihood that a
mistake would be made as to the value of the property.
This rule has been followed in England.20 The other line
of cases hold that the measure of damage is the difference
between the actual value and the represented value.2 '
In Pennsylvania the decisions are in hopeless conflict;
some holding the measure of damage to be the difference
between the value of the property at the time of the sale
and the price paid; others holding the measure of damage
to be the difference between the actual value and the rep-
resented value.2 2 The reason for the former rule seems
to be, that if any other measure of damage were used, one
would be recovering purely speculative profits he might
have anticipated but never made; whereas he should only
recover that with which he has parted for which he has
received no equivalent.22 In a case involving the sale of
stock 24 the measure of damage for fraud was the difference
l8Wolstenholme v. Randall, (1928) 295 Pa. 131.
19 Reversed on some other ground, Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 App.
Cus. 337.
2 0Arkwright v. Newbold, 17 Chan. Div. 301; Huntingford v.
Massey, 1 F. & F. 690.
21Clare v. Maynard, (1837) 7 C. & P. 741; Towers v. Burrett,
(1786) 1 T. R. 133.
22Long v. McAllister, (1922) 275 Pa. 34 and cases cited therein
as to both rules.
2SHigh v. Berret, (1892) 148 Pa. 261, cited with approval in
Browning v. Rodman, (1920) 268 Pa. 575.
24Curtis v. Buzard, (1916) 254 Pa. 61, cited with approval in Long
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between the actual value and the price paid. If the meas-
ure had been the actual value and represented value it
might have been possible for the buyer to show that the
represented value was enough more than the actual value
to thereby wipe out the purchase price and get the stock
for nothing.
As to the second rule, it was first enunciated in a
case where the defendant had told the plaintiff that the
property in question was sound, when in fact it was not.
The court held the measure of damage to be the difference
between the actual value of the property and the represent-
ed value.25 The basis for this rule is, that the defrauded
party is entitled to the benefit of his bargain and should
be put in the same position as he would have been had the
representation been true. Another reason is that if the
"plaintiff made a good bargain, he is entitled to the bargain.
But the benefit received cannot be set off against the claim
that the seller should make good his false assertions. If
the plaintiff made a bad bargain he should likewise be held
to that bargain and he cannot get more damages because
of the defendant's fraud."
A recent case on this subject is that of Kriner v. Dinger,
(1929) 297 Pa. 576. The plaintiff sold to the defendant a
mill property in return for $5000 par value stock of a
milling co. organized by the defendant and $5000 par value
stock of a certain coal mining co., as part payment of the
purchase price. The sale to defendant was made in re-
liance on certain false and fraudulent representations made
by the defendant as to the quality and quantity of coal to
be mined by the latter corporation. The stock was in fact
worthless and had been returned to the defendant. In the
trial court the defendant asked the court to charge that the
measure of damage is the "difference between the value
of the stock as it was represented to be and the value as
it really was". This measure of damage limited the in-
quiry to the stock of the mining co. Defendant now com-
plains that the charge was wrong. The Court held that
defendant cannot now complain; the charge when given
v. McAllister, supra; Grant v. Lovekin, (1920) 285 Pa. 257; O'Rourke
v. Blockson, (1918) 69 Pa. Super. Ct. 93.
25Thompson v. Burger, (1860) 36 Pa. 403.
26Stetson v. Croskey, (1866) 52 Pa. 230; cited with approval in
Rock, Executor v. Cauffiel, (1921) 271 Pa.. 560; Martachowski v.
Orawitz, (1900) 14 Pa. Super. Ct. 175: Smysers v. McMahon, (1918)
71 Pa. Super. Ct. 142.
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was of his own making and he cannot be heard to com-
plain. Another reason given was that the defendant failed
to show the actual value of the property in question at
the time the agreement was made.
The Court held the measure of damage to be the
difference between the actual value of all that the plaintiff
received and all that he gave. In other words it was the dif-
ference between the actual value and the price paid. This
case does not set forth the represented value as. the meas-
ure of damage. The only reason why the represented
value was used in the trial court is because the defendant
asked for it even though detrimental to him. In laying
down the true measure of damage the court cites the case
of Browning v. Rodman, supra.
2
1
The latest case on this subject 28 holds that in the case
of fraudulent representations in the sale of stock the
measure of damage is the difference between the price paid
and the actual value of the stock. In case the stock had
no value, the amount would be determined by what the
plaintiff had paid for the stock.
In summing up we find the following propositions to
be true as to the measure of damage:-
1. Breach of Warranty-The difference between the
price paid and the value of the goods had the representa-
tions been true.
2. Fraudulent Representations-The difference be-
tween the price paid and the actual value.
Are we to infer that the courts are placing a premium
on fraud when they allow greater damages for breach
of warranty than for fraudulent representations?
Joseph Maimon
RESTORATION OF CONSIDERATION IN IN-
FANTS' DISAFFIRMANCE OF PURCHASE OF PER-
SONAL PROPERTY-Installment selling has become one
of the common features of our every day life. Automobiles,
pianos, victrolas, household furniture, practically all or-
dinary commodities can now be bought on the time-pay-
ment plan. Often these sales are made to minors and these
2TSee Note 23.
28s1oagland v. Mulford, (1930) 148 A. 864; cites with approval-
Curtis v. Buzard, supra; Browning v. Rodman, supra; Long v. Mc-
Allister, supra.
